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CONTRACTS - SUBROGATION - PARTIAL SUBROGATION OF A CAUSE OF AC-
TION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES - Plaintiff, an incorporated home for the 
aged, provided all essential medical care to one of its residents under the 
provisions of a life-care contract between it and the resident. On the basis 
of a contract clause which purported to subrogate plaintiff to the right of 
the resident to recover medical expenses caused by the negligence of third 
parties, plaintiff brought an action to recover certain medical expenses 
incurred from the party who was allegedly responsible for the injuries and 
death of the resident. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint 
for failure to state a cause of action and dismissed the case. On appeal to 
the California Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The statutory prohibition 
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against the assignment of personal injury claimst precluded the transfer of 
claims for medical expenses by subrogation. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 
Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960). 
A right of subrogation was denied in the principal case because, like 
assignment, subrogation would transfer a cause of action for personal in-
juries to a third party; the policy barring assignment was considered to 
apply to subrogation also.2 The common law rule barred the assignment 
of personal injury claims because these claims did not survive the death 
of the wrongdoer or injured party, a characteristic which was regarded as 
essential to transferable property rights.s This rule of nontransferability 
frustrated early attempts of life insurers to obtain subrogation against a 
negligent third party who caused the death of one of its policyholders.4 
Even in states which have provided for the survival of a personal injury 
action, many courts would narrowly construe such a statute which abrogates 
the common law and thus would require an express act of the legislature to 
make such actions assignable.11 However, the retention of this common-law 
rule should not be based solely on the technical rules of statutory construc-
tion. It would seem more persuasive to bar the assignment of personal 
injury claims because of the need to protect an injured party confronted 
with the difficulty of determining a fair consideration for transferring his 
unliquidated claim for damages. Allowing the unrestricted transfer of per-
sonal injury claims might open the door for assignees to attempt to profit 
at the expense of necessitous injured parties through champertous practices.6 
However, in the case of partial subrogation of the injured party's cause of 
1 CAL. CIV. CoDE § 956. 
2 Principal case at 382. But cf. General Acr.., Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. Zerbe Constr. 
Co., 269 N.Y. 227, 199 N.E. 89 (1935) (workmen's compensation insurer equitably entitled 
to subrogation); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (insurer 
entitled to subrogation when insured was injured by a government employee). 
8 4 CORBIN, CoNTRACI'S § 857 (1951). For collected cases, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 
(1955). 
-i Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New 
York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856). Early attempts at subrogation under health and 
accident insurance policies were denied on the ground that these were not indemnity 
contracts. See Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 
(1908), where the court held that in the absence of a contractual stipulation that the 
insurer was to be regarded as an indemnitor, the insured had an absolute right to the 
proceeds of the policy. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 72 
S.W. 621 (1902), a[J'd, 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903), where the court held that the 
policy was not one of indemnity since the insurer did not undertake to be responsible 
for the entire loss suffered by the insured. 
II There is a split of authority whether a survival statute also operates to make a 
cause of action assignable. Compare Grand Rapids & I. R.R. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 
161 Mich. 181, 126 N.W. 56 (1910) (survival statute did make action assignable), with 
Betltlehem Fabricators v. H. D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828 (1934) (sur-
vival statute did not make action assignable). For collected cases, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 
500 (1955). 
6 See CORBIN, CoNTRACI'S §§ 1422, 1427 (1950). 
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action in the amount of medical expenses paid for him, the right transferred 
to the subrogee is valued by the specific payments he has made for the 
benefit of the injured party.7 Therefore, since the subrogee's recovery is 
restricted to reimbursement for the medical expense he has actually in-
curred, champertous practices should not develop. 
One compelling reason for allowing recovery on the subrogated portion 
of the cause of action is suggested by the fact that the majority of states 
allow the injured party to recover his medical expenses from the negligent 
party even though they have been paid by a collateral source such as a 
medical insurer.8 This is done to prevent the negligent party from bene-
fiting from a contract made by or for the benefit of the injured party.o 
However, this rule enables the injured party to profit through the double 
payment of medical expenses although the law has sought only to com-
pensate him. This unnecessary enrichment of the injured party would be 
prevented and the burden of the loss properly placed upon the negligent 
party if the collateral source was allowed to prosecute his contractual right 
of subrogation. Where, as in the principal case, the court denies a right 
of subrogation, the total cost of compensating for negligent acts is unnec-
essarily increased by the profits received by injured parties; this undesirable 
result is reached by the dogmatic adherence to a common law rule of non-
transferability where the reason for the rule has been abrogated by a sur-
vival statute.to 
On the other hand, when a medical insurer has not obtained a con-
tractual right of subrogation, it becomes a primary obligor and is liable for 
the medical expenses of the insured injured party without regard to the 
manner in which the expenses were incurred. Most courts deny such an 
insurer a subrogated cause of action in order to prevent the unjust enrich-
ment of the insurer through the nonpayment of its primary obligation.11 
Consequently, the total cost of compensating for negligent acts is increased 
by emphasizing the possible unjust enrichment of the insurer rather than 
the unnecessary profit of the injured party. 
The proper solution of these problems which arise in compensating for 
personal injuries does not lie in discouraging payments from collateral 
sources by denying them a right of reimbursement. Such payments are highly 
useful in shifting the cost of carrying the wrongdoer's obligation from the 
7 Cf. Black v. Chicago&: G.W. R.R., 187 Iowa 904, 174 N.W. 774 (1919). 
8 The overwhelming majority of states would not reduce the damages recoverable by 
the amount of the medical expenses paid by an outside source. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES 
§ 90 (1935). For collected cases, see Annot., 95 A.L.R. 575 (1935); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 
355 (1950)h 
o See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 90 (1935). 
10 The California survival statute provides an interesting paradox. Although it 
removes the reason for barring assignment, it prohibits the assignment of personal injury 
claims. CAL. CIV. ConE § 956. 
11 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 373, 63 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1954). 
However, where the policy contains a subrogation clause there would be no unjust en-
richment. Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 577, 64 N.W.2d 713,714 (1954). 
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injured party to the collateral source during the time lag between accident 
and recovery. Indeed, if the collateral source is allowed to turn to the 
wrongdoer to recover the medical expenses which it has incurred on behalf 
of the injured party, it would be encouraged to make funds available for 
the timely payment of medical bills at a lower cost to the insured. These 
considerations seem more meaningful than any technical reason for denying 
the plaintiff a right to be subrogated to that part of the injured party's 
cause of action which represents the cost of medical treatment.1 2 
Only partial subrogation of a cause of action will, however, bring into 
play many of the procedural difficulties associated with splitting a cause of 
action. If the action brought in the subrogee's name proceeded to judg-
ment, the injured party would be prevented by the principles of res judicata 
from prosecuting a subsequent action to recover for his remaining injuries.13 
If the injured party were allowed a second action, the defendant would 
be required to defend the same cause of action twice. These considerations 
should preclude the subrogee from bringing an action in his own name, but 
they do not require that he be denied a substantive right to recover for 
medical expense payments. In common law states, the procedural difficulties 
associated with splitting a cause of action may be avoided when the action 
is brought in the name of, or by, the injured party for the benefit of the 
subrogee who would share in the proceeds to the extent of the medical 
expenses it has paid.14 In this case it would seem proper for the court to 
apportion the judgment between the injured party and the subrogee. In 
jurisdictions which require the action to be brought in the name of the 
real party in interest, the injured party and the subrogee should be re-
quired to join as co-plaintiffs, each recovering a judgment reflecting his 
interest in the cause of action. Both the injured party and the subrogee 
should be treated as indispensable parties to prevent the possibility of a 
second suit on the same cause of action.15 
In the principal case, the court could have properly dismissed the action, 
because the plaintiff did not, under a real party in interest statute,16 join 
the resident's estate.17 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to construe an 
anti-assignment statute so broadly as to deny a substantive right to partial 
subrogation by contract; the court did not appear to consider the reasons 
which seem to compel the opposite result. The foregoing considerations 
should demonstrate the need for corrective action to facilitate payment and 
reduce the cost of compensating personal injuries. 
Jerome M. Salle 
12 These considerations have been given effect in the area of workmen's compensation. 
See CAL. I.An. CoDE § 3852. 
13 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 155 Cal. App. 2d 861 (1957); City of New 
York v. Barbato, 5 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Manhattan Munic. Ct. 1938) (dictum). 
14 BLUIIIE, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7-03 (1955). 
15 United States v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., supra note 2; BLUME, op. cit. supra note 
14, § 7-03. Cf. 51 MICH. L. REv. 587 (1952). 
16 CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 367. 
17 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389. 
